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THE PRIVACY OF DEATH: AN EMERGENT
JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL REBUKE TO
MEDIA EXPLOITATION AND A VOYEURISTIC
CULTURE
Clay Calvert*
I. INTRODUCTION
Legal scholars are fretfully predicting the possible death of privacy-
in particular, informational privacy-in coming years.' This thesis is even
found in the subtitle of a recent book,2 and there certainly is no doubt that
privacy is increasingly sacrificed in our voyeuristic, tabloid-journalism
culture.3 While legal scholars have focused on the death of privacy, a
nascent, inchoate, and sometimes politically-charged jurisprudence has
* Associate Professor of Communications & Law, Co-Director of the Pennsylvania Center
for the First Amendment, and Interim Dean of the Schreyer Honors College at Pennsylvania State
University. Ph.D., Communication, Stanford University, 1996; J.D. (Order of the Coil),
McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific, 1991; B.A with Distinction,
Communication, Stanford University, 1987. Member of the State Bar of California. The author
thanks the staff of the law review for its patience during the editing process after the author
unexpectedly assumed the role of Interim Dean of the Schreyer Honors College in August 2005,
thus necessitating more time to implement revisions,
1. See A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1543 (2000)
("Given the rapid pace at which privacy-destroying technologies are being invented and
deployed, a legal response must come soon, or it will indeed be too late."); see also Shaun B.
Spencer, Reasonable Expectations and the Erosion of Privacy, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 843, 845
(2002) ("[I]nformational asymmetry, unequal bargaining power, and collective action problems
[constitute] phenomena [that] stack the deck against those who would preserve the private sphere,
and in favor of those who benefit from its erosion. Without some structural changes to restore the
balance, the erosion of privacy may be a foregone conclusion.").
2. SIMSON GARFINKEL, DATABASE NATION: THE DEATH OF PRIVACY IN THE 21ST
CENTURY (2001).
3. See Clay Calvert, Revisiting the Voyeurism Value in the First Amendment: From the
Sexually Sordid to the Details of Death, 27 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 721 (2004) (examining the
fundamental tension between maintaining privacy and accelerating voyeurism); see also ELLEN
ALDERMAN & CAROLINE KENNEDY, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY xiii (1995) (stating that "more and
more of our privacy is stripped away" despite the complaints of many people "that the press can
invade lives with impunity").
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emerged: the privacy of death.4
It is a jurisprudence that focuses not simply on the privacy rights of
the dead, but also on the privacy rights of the deceased's immediate
relatives. These rights include their ability to control the publication of
postmortem images and the dying words of their departed loved ones. As a
result, the traditional notion of informational privacy, 5 "an individual's
ability to control what others know about him,' 6 has been transformed into
a relative 's ability to control what others see about the death of his or her
late family members.7
Autopsy photographs, death-scene images of suicides, pictures of the
dead in both open and closed caskets, and tapes and transcripts of
emergency telephone calls that contain dying words, are frequently found
at the center of privacy-of-death controversies.8 The issue frequently boils
down to how to strike a proper legal balance between the public's
unenumerated right 9 to newsworthy information l0 about the dead, and
4. See George J. Annas, Family Privacy and Death-Antigone, War, and Medical Research,
NEW ENG. J. MED., Feb. 3, 2005, at 501 ("Family privacy concerning a family member who has
died is at the forefront of a continuing political dispute in the United States.").
5. Informational privacy is to be distinguished from autonomy privacy. See Dorothy J.
Glancy, Privacy on the Open Road, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 295, 321 (2004) ("[M]odem legal
analysis conventionally divides privacy interests into two categories: autonomy privacy (or
decisional privacy) interests and information privacy (or data privacy) interests.").
6. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Consent, Aesthetics, and the Boundaries of Sexual Privacy After
Lawrence v. Texas, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 671, 677 (2005) (emphasis added); see Paul M.
Schwartz, German and U.S. Telecommunications Privacy Law: Legal Regulation of Domestic
Law Enforcement Surveillance, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 751, 798 (2003) ("[T]he right of information
privacy has often been seen as an individual right of control.").
7. "The range of privacy issues concerning familial relations is immense." Nancy Levit,
Family Privacy Bibliography: Family Privacy, 17 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 183, 183
(2001). This comment, however, concentrates on one specific aspect of relational privacy,
namely the ability of relatives of the dead to control and punish the disclosure and publication of
death images and dying words of their deceased family members.
8. Infra notes 12-198 (discussing the Favish opinion); see, e.g., Nat'l Archives & Records
Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157 (2004) (involving the dispute over death scene images of a
suicide).
9. Although not found in either the U.S. Constitution or in the amendments to it, journalists
often invoke "the public's right to know" when it comes to publishing information. For instance,
the Code of Ethics of the Society of Professional Journalists provides that "[j]oumalists should be
free of [an] obligation to any interest other than the public's right to know." Code of Ethics,
Society of Professional Journalists, http://www.spj.org/ethics.pdf (last visited Sept. 18, 2005)
(emphasis added). See generally Eric B. Easton, Public Importance: Balancing Proprietary
Interests and the Right to Know, 21 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 139, 141-43 (2003) (discussing
the First Amendment and the implied right to know).
10. Newsworthiness is particularly relevant here; it provides a defense to tort causes of
action based on public disclosure of private facts. It may also be conceptualized as "subject to a
three-part test involving the social value of the published facts, the depth of intrusion into
ostensibly private affairs, and whether the person acceded voluntarily to a position of public
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concerns for the family's privacy rights, emotional tranquility, solemn
respect, and dignity. I I.
Today's growth in privacy-of-death jurisprudence is fueled in part by
the United States Supreme Court's decision in National Archives &
Records Administration v. Favish.12 In Favish, the High Court recognized
"the right of family members to direct and control disposition of the body
of the deceased and to limit attempts to exploit pictures of the deceased
family member's remains for public purposes."13  Justice Anthony
Kennedy wrote for a unanimous Court that "[f]amily members have a
personal stake in honoring and mourning their dead and objecting to
unwarranted public exploitation that, by intruding upon their own grief,
tends to degrade the rites and respect they seek to accord to the deceased
person who was once their own."'14 The Court ultimately ruled in favor of
the privacy interests of Vincent Foster's immediate relatives. Moreover, it
rejected the request of attorney Allan Favish to present photographs that he
believed might prove the fact of Foster's murder.
15
The Favish opinion was jurisprudentially revolutionary because "the
Court fully recognized for the first time that surviving family members
enjoy a privacy interest that must be considered when analyzing the release
of agency records."1 6 While the case centered on the statutory construction
of FOIA and government agency records, the reasoning of the nation's
High Court was not nearly so limited. The Supreme Court expanded the
scope of its decision by commenting that a "well-established cultural
tradition acknowledging a family's control over the body and death images
of the deceased has long been recognized at common law."'7 This means
that the privacy-of-death jurisprudence arises from both statutory freedom-
notoriety." M.G. v. Time Warner, Inc., 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 504, 511 (Ct. App. 2001).
11. See, e.g., Providence Journal Co. v. Town of W. Warwick, No. 03-2697, 2004 R.I.
Super. LEXIS 136, at *6-8 (R.I. Super. Ct. 2004) (stating that the court "cannot conceive of a
greater affront to such dignity than permitting others to listen to the anguish that is embodied" in
911 emergency telephone calls made by the dying victims, and reasoning that "these
communications are entitled to protection whether initiated by victims or family members to
avoid a highly intrusive interference with the legitimate privacy entitlement these individuals
should be afforded") (emphasis added).
12. Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157 (2004).
13. Id. at 167.
14. Id. at 168.
15. Id. at 161. The facts surrounding Foster's death appear relatively settled. Five separate
government investigations into Foster's death concluded that he committed suicide, however,
Favish disputed these findings and found them untrustworthy.
16. Joseph Romero, National Archives & Record Administration v. Favish: Protecting
Against the Prying Eye, the Disbelievers, and the Curious, 50 NAVAL L. REV. 70, 70 (2004).
17. Favish, 541 U.S. at 168 (emphasis added).
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of-information laws and from judge-made common law. The Court gave
the green light to judges across the country to recognize family members'
privacy rights over the images of their dead loved ones beyond the narrow
confines of FOIA access disputes. The Favish Court cited an 1895 New
York Court of Appeals decision for the following proposition:
[I]t is the right of the living, and not that of the dead, which is
recognized. A privilege may be given the surviving relatives of
a deceased person to protect his memory, but the privilege exists
for the benefit of the living, to protect their feelings, and to
prevent a violation of their own rights in the character and
memory of the deceased.18
The High Court's willingness to use a state court precedent that is
more than 100 years old indicates its commitment to a privacy-of-death
jurisprudence.
The aftermath of the Favish opinion brought a new wave of disputes
concerning privacy rights over the information and images related to
death.19 For instance, in July 2004, Rhode Island Superior Court Judge
Mark Pfieffer cited to Favish when he held that tapes of 911 emergency
calls made by the dying victims of a fire that ripped through a West
Warwick nightclub in 200320 could be suppressed under the state's Access
to Public Records Act.21  Judge Pfieffer wrote that "[t]hese
communications are entitled to protection whether initiated by victims or
family members to avoid a highly intrusive interference with the
legitimate privacy entitlement these individuals should be afforded.,
22
Important in this case was the judicial recognition of "the privacy interests
and the dignity of the victims and their family members., 23 In other words,
both the decedents and their living family members have privacy interests.
The year 2005 brought more high-profile decisions involving battles
to suppress images and information about the dead from public disclosure
18. Id. at 168-69 (quoting Schuyler v. Curtis, 42 N.E. 22, 25 (N.Y. 1895)).
19. See, e.g., Samuel A. Terilli & Sigman L. Splichal, Public Access to Autopsy and Death-
Scene Photographs: Relational Privacy, Public Records and Avoidable Collisions, 10 COMM. L
& POL'Y 313, 325 (2005) ("[T]here is no question that Favish will be significant and will affect
the concerns raised by various parties and judges in a number of cases.").
20. See generally Michael Powell & Christopher Lee, R.I Nightclub Fire Kills 96, WASH.
POST, Feb. 22, 2003, at A01 (describing how "[a]t least 96 people burned to death" at the Station
nightclub, in West Warwick, R.I., during a concert by Great White, a heavy metal band, when a
pyrotechnics show started a fire that triggered "one of the worst such tragedies in the nation's
history").
21. Providence Journal Co., 2004 R.I. Super. LEXIS 136, at *6.
22. Id. at *6-7.
23. Id. at *12.
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24
or to punish individuals and entities that had previously published images.
The following cases from the first half of 2005 involved privacy concerns
of the deceased versus the interests of the public:
- In June 2005, a complaint for multiple causes of action, including
invasion of privacy 25 and intentional infliction of emotional distress, 26 was
filed in federal district court in Oklahoma against the publisher of Harper's
magazine. The action stemmed from a photograph the magazine published
that captured a private, open-casket funeral of a National Guardsman killed
while on duty in Iraq.27 The complaint was filed by the deceased soldier's
biological father and the administrator of the decedent's estate. The
complaint alleged that the photograph was "emotional, sensational[,] and
disturbing ' 28 and that its publication took place to "reap recognition, sales,
business[,] and profits" '29 for Harper's at the expense of plaintiffs' privacy
rights and emotional tranquility. 30 Another brief filed in June 2005 stated,
"[T]he First Amendment 31 does not shield the defendants from liability for
the unlawful and unauthorized publication of photographs of Kyle Showler
Brinlee's remains, nor does the First Amendment allow the Defendants to
invade the privacy (rights) of the grieving family members.'
3 2
24. See infra notes 26-56 (describing relevant disputes from 2005).
25. First Amended Complaint at 6-9, Showier v. Harper's Mag. Found., Case No. 05-CV-
178-S (E.D. Okla. June 14, 2005) (setting forth the invasion of privacy cause of action).
Although the amended complaint failed to specify by name which of the four privacy torts was
being pled, a close reading of the complaint indicates that it was for the privacy tort of public
disclosure of private facts; see generally JOHN D. ZELEZNY, COMMUNICATIONS LAW: LIBERTIES,
RESTRAINTS, AND THE MODERN MEDIA 181-90 (4th ed. 2004) (describing the tort of public
disclosure of private facts).
26. See generally DON R. PEMBER & CLAY CALVERT, MASS MEDIA LAW 204-06
(2005/2006 ed.) (providing an overview of the tort of the intentional infliction of emotional
distress, including its basic elements).
27. First Amended Complaint at 4, Showler v. Harper's Mag. Found., No. 05-CV-178-S
(E.D. Okla. June 14, 2005).
28. Id. at 6.
29. Id. at 7 ("In disregard for Plaintiffs' right of privacy, the photograph depicting Kyle's
remains was published without Plaintiffs' consent so the Defendants would reap recognition,
sales, business[,] and profits.").
30. Id.
31. U.S. CONST. amend. I (providing in relevant part that "Congress shall make no
law.., abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.") (emphasis added). The Free Speech
and Free Press Clauses have been incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause to apply to state and local government entities and officials. See Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
32. Plaintiffs' Brief in Support of Their Response and Objection to Defendant Harper's
Magazine Foundation's and Peter Turnley's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim for
Which Relief can be Granted at 6, Showler v. Harper's Mag. Found., No. 05-CV-178-S (E.D.
Okla. June 15, 2005).
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- In May 2005, a Delaware court addressed the issue of whether the
common law or statutory law of that state recognizes a privacy interest in
the family of a deceased person, sufficient to prevent the public disclosure
of autopsy and toxicology reports.33 Rejecting the notion of such a
common law right, the court found that "the overwhelming weight of
authority holds that a claim for invasion of privacy cannot be brought by a
decedent's family. 34 However, the court acknowledged that a very small
minority of courts have held otherwise.35
In April 2005, in response to a Freedom of Information Act request
by journalism professor Ralph Begleiter,36 the Pentagon publicly released
hundreds of photographs "of flag-draped caskets bearing American soldiers
killed in combat., 37 The Pentagon, however, "continues to refuse to allow
journalists to photograph the arriving coffins independently ' 38 at Dover Air
Force Base in Delaware when soldiers' remains return from Iraq and
Afghanistan. That ban, which began in 1991, ostensibly39 is intended to
protect the privacy rights of the families of deceased military personnel.40
- Also in April 2005, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, citing the
Favish opinion, considered the privacy interests of decedents and their
families in keeping the records of alleged sexual abuse by eighteen Roman
Catholic priests private-a dispute that arose under Maine's Freedom of
33. Lawson v. Meconi, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 74 (Ct. of Chancery May 27, 2005).
34. Id. at *18.
35. See id. at * 19-20 (discussing the Washington Supreme Court's recognition of a privacy
interest held by the immediate relatives of a decedent in the autopsy records of their dead
relatives in Reid v. Pierce County, 961 P.2d 333 (Wash. 1998)).
36. See Begleiter Professional Biography, http://www.udel.edu/communication/COMM418/
begleite/beglhome/beglbio.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2005) (stating that Begleiter is a former
CNN world affairs correspondent who now is a professor at the University of Delaware).
37. John Hendren, Photos of War Dead Released by Pentagon, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2005,
at A8.
38. Id.
39. Some claim the real intent of this ban has nothing to do with privacy but the White
House "suppressing images of dead soldiers to avoid eroding public support for the conflict." Joe
Garofoli & Matthew B. Stannard, Flag-Draped Coffin Photos Released, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 29,
2005, at A10.
40. Neil Henry, Picture Power: The Image in Wartime and the Digital Age, 19 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHics & PUB. POL'Y 475, 481 (2005) ("Throughout the war and occupation, the
administration prohibited journalists from taking photos of the dead, citing a desire to protect the
privacy of family and loved ones."); see Ann Scott Tyson, Hundreds of Photos of Caskets
Released, WASH. POST, Apr. 29, 2005, at A10 (stating that the ban was "first imposed in January
1991 during the Gulf War and continued by President Bush with the start of the Afghanistan war
in October 2001" and quoting Col. Gary Keck, a Defense Department spokesman, for the
proposition that the ban is intended to "ensure privacy and respect is given to the families who
have lost their loved ones").
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Access Act.41 Observing that the last acts of alleged abuse happened two
decades ago in 1983, the court held that "the passage of time has largely
extinguished the residual privacy interests of the deceased priests, if any,
and of their immediate family members. '' 2
- In March 2005, New York's highest court held in New York Times
Company v. City of New York Fire Department4 3 that the dying words of
callers made to 911 emergency operators on September 11, 2001 from the
World Trade Center towers were protected from disclosure under a privacy
exemption of the state's Freedom of Information Law (FOIL). 4 While
acknowledging the New York Times' position that "the public has a
legitimate interest in knowing how well or poorly the 911 system
performed on that day, 'A5 the appellate court held that the privacy interests
against disclosure were "compelling ' 46 and recognized "that surviving
relatives have a legally protected privacy interest'' 47 that trumped the
public's right to know what the deceased said.48 This echoes both the result
and reasoning of another dying-words case more than a dozen years before
where a federal court protected from disclosure under the federal FOIA law
the dying words of the Challenger space shuttle crew members. 49  The
court in that case noted that "[e]xposure to the voice of a beloved family
member immediately prior to that family member's death is what would
cause the Challenger families pain. 5 °
Besides these cases, 2005 witnessed in very different contexts other
legal disputes over photographs of the dead. For instance, an insurance
41. Blethen Me. Newspapers, Inc. v. Maine, 871 A.2d 523, 529 (Me. 2005).
42. Id. at 532.
43. N.Y. Times Co. v. City of N.Y. Fire Dep't, 829 N.E.2d 266 (N.Y. 2005).
44. Id. at 271 ("We conclude that the public interest in the words of the 911 callers is
outweighed by the interest in privacy of those family merbers and callers who prefer that those
words remain private.").
45. Id.
46. Id. at 270.
47. Id.
48. But see Jim Dwyer et al., Vast Archive Yields New View of 9/11, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13,
2005, at 1 ("[T]he city of New York [in August 2005] opened part of its archive of records from
Sept. 11, releasing a digital avalanche of oral histories, dispatchers' tapes and phone logs so vast
that they took up 23 compact discs."). Importantly, this material did "not include any of the calls
from citizens to 911 that day." William Murphy, Court Orders Release of Firefighters'
Recordings, NEWSDAY, Aug. 6, 2005, at A10.
49. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Nat'l Aeronautics & Space Admin., 782 F. Supp. 628, 633 (D.
D.C. 1991) (stating that the Challenger space shuttle exploded in January 1986 shortly after its
launch) ("The Court finds that the Challenger families' privacy interest in the tape in question
outweighs the public interest such that release of the tape would constitute a clearly unwarranted
invasion of the families' personal privacy.").
50. Id. at 631.
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company contested the settlement of a lawsuit for intentional and negligent
infliction of emotional distress, where the plaintiff alleged that after she
delivered her two stillborn children "she was shown photographs of the
dead twins ' 5 and that "the hospital and a photo business posed and
photographed the deceased children, and presented her with pictures
printed with words of congratulations. '52
Finally, autopsy photographs and the medical examiner's recordings
of the late Terri Schiavo-a woman who died a controversial death in 2005
after a feeding tube was removed from her body53-were prevented from
public release due to a 2001 Florida law54 passed after the death of
NASCAR driver Dale Earnhardt.55 One legal scholar has observed that
while Florida was "a state with open-records laws that have been regarded
as a model for other states, '56 including with regard to autopsy photos,
"[t]he Earnhardt/Family Protection Act now allows release of such
materials only by a judge's order., 57 Other states also limit by statute the
public disclosure of autopsy photographs, while giving special rights of
access and control to family members and the decedent's relatives.
58
51. Hospital Allegedly Photographs Dead Babies, TEXAS INS. L. & LITIG. ALERT, June 15,
2005, at 3.
52. Id.
53. See generally Manuel Roig-Franzia, Long Legal Battle Over as Schiavo Dies, WASH.
POST, Apr. 1, 2005, at Al (describing Schiavo's death and some of the ethical and legal issues
raised by the debate about whether to remove her feeding tube).
54. See FLA. STAT. ANN § 406.135 (West 2002) (providing that "[a] photograph or video or
audio recording of an autopsy in the custody of a medical examiner is confidential and exempt"
from disclosure under Florida's open records laws unless a judge determines it should be released
"upon a showing of good cause," a determination that is to take into account whether "such
disclosure is necessary for the public evaluation of governmental performance; the seriousness of
the intrusion into the family's right to privacy and whether such disclosure is the least intrusive
means available; and the availability of similar information in other public records, regardless of
form").
55. See Jill King Greenwood, Terri Schiavo's Remains Cremated After Autopsy, TAMPA
TRIB., Apr. 3, 2005, at Metro I ("While the autopsy report will be made public, images and
recordings are kept sealed under a 2001 law passed after the death of race car driver Dale
Earnhardt.").
56. Martin E. Halstuk, Shielding Private Lives From Prying Eyes: The Escalating Conflict
Between Constitutional Privacy and the Accountability Principle of Democracy, II COMMLAW
CONSPECTUS 71, 94 (2003).
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 45-16-27(d) (1981) (exempting from public disclosure,
under Georgia's open records laws, autopsy photographs unless the photographs are for "law
enforcement agencies and prosecutors for law enforcement purposes or, in closed criminal
investigations, to medical schools, medical facilities, and physicians for medical purposes; to
individuals who have secured a written release from the deceased's next of kin; or to the next of
kin"); IND. CODE ANN. § 36-2-14-10 (2000) (providing that "a photograph, video recording, or
audio recording of an autopsy in the custody of a medical examiner is declared confidential for
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Autopsy photograph and recording statutes thus constitute a new and
particular niche of the larger privacy-of-death jurisprudence discussed in
this article.
Given the relative newness in the United States of the legal right of
privacy, 59 "[t]he widespread discontent over conceptualizing privacy[,]
' 60
and "the great difficulty in reaching a satisfying conception of privacy[,, 61
today's ferment about the privacy rights of the decedent's relatives is not
62surprising. But, given both the media's propensity for invasiveness and
sensationalism with respect to death,63 and the likelihood that cases, such as
those described above, will arise in the future, close attention on this topic
is warranted.64 If, as philosopher Sissela Bok contends, "[t]here is no clear
purposes of' Indiana's open records laws, but allowing a surviving spouse to view and copy such
photographs and recordings, and adding that "[i]f there is no surviving spouse, the surviving
parents shall have access to the records under this section. If there is no surviving spouse or
parent, an adult child shall have access to the records."); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-39-7.1-4(a)-(b)
(1993 & Supp. 2004) (providing a "good cause" exemption from the general rule against
disclosure of autopsy photographs set forth in section 36-2-14-10 of the Indiana Code, and setting
forth four specific factors that judges must consider in a good cause determination, including "the
seriousness of the intrusion into the family's right to privacy"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-4-40(a)(18)
(2004) (exempting from public disclosure "[p]hotographs, videos, and other visual images, and
audio recordings of and related to the performance of an autopsy" but allowing, by direct
reference to section 17-5-535 of the South Carolina Code of Laws, the parents of the deceased,
surviving spouse, children, guardian, personal representative next of kin, and any other person
given permission or authorization to view or possess the visual images by the personal
representative of the deceased's estate).
59. See James P. Nehf, Recognizing the Societal Value in Information Privacy, 78 WASH. L.
REV. 1, 29 (2003) ("Privacy law in the United States did not begin to develop until the middle of
the twentieth century.").
60. Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1089 (2002).
61. Id. at 1088.
62. Currently, other aspects of privacy are also in a stage of ferment and change, such as
sexual privacy rights surrounding both same-sex marriage and consensual sexual conduct, with
the U.S. Supreme Court sharply divided on the latter in 2003. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558, 561, 564, 594-5 (2003) (striking down, in a six to three decision, a Texas anti-sodomy law,
and including a blistering dissent by Justice Scalia criticizing, among other things, the Court's
right-to-privacy jurisprudence).
63. As an illustration of the likelihood of this scenario in the context of death-scene images
of suicides, Louisiana State University Professor Louis Alvin Day writes that "where suicides or
suicide attempts are captured on videotape, a likely occurrence in today's electronic age, TV
stations should use such footage with caution. Competitive pressures and the excitement of such
dramatic footage can lead to a moral lapse on the part of some producers and news directors."
LOuis ALVIN DAY, ETHICS IN MEDIA COMMUNICATIONS: CASES AND CONTROVERSIES 144 (4th
ed. 2003).
64. Questions about postmortem confidentiality and privacy were addressed in a 2001 law
journal article, but that article concentrated only on medical records, and it was written several
years before the Favish opinion and current lawsuits. Jessica Berg, Grave Secrets: Legal and
Ethical Analysis of Postmortem Confidentiality, 34 CONN. L. REV. 81, 83 (2001) (reviewing "the
scope of confidentiality protections and exceptions [about medical information] for people who
2006]
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line surrounding private life that can demarcate regions journalists ought
not to explore[,] ' ' 65 then it is not surprising that there is no clear line, either
legally or ethically, surrounding private death that journalists must not
cross.
Part II of this article explores the non-legal and extra-judicial forces at
work that may be influencing, if not driving, the current spate of lawsuits
and litigation related to the public disclosure of images and information
about the dead.66 Part II offers an understanding of the role that the news
media may play in shaping the current and future contours of the law in this
area. Part III attempts to distinguish the diverse ways in which litigation
over images of the dead and their dying words may arise.67 Additionally,
Part III examines historical precedent, highlighting cases from the past that
provide necessary background for understanding current disputes. This
part also delves into both the factual underpinnings and judicial reasoning
of the cases described in the introduction.
Finally, Part IV creates, proposes, and articulates a set of six factors
for courts to apply when considering the privacy interests of the decedent's
relatives. 68  These factors, some of which are distilled from the cases
described in Part III, are applied in the context of civil lawsuits concerning
the publication of images of the dead and in access-to-information disputes
under states' open records laws. Part III argues that the law must, either by
legislative or judicial fiat, recognize that the immediate relatives of the
dead do possess a qualified, albeit not absolute, privacy right in preventing
media exploitation of their late loved ones' words and images. The six
factors articulated in Part IV should be used to determine when that
qualified right has been outweighed by the public's right to know.
II. DEATH AND THE MEDIA: "IT'S INTERESTING WHEN PEOPLE DIE
' 69
The American television news media has continued to test, push, and
have died" and analyzing "the type and extent of interests in maintaining confidentiality
postmortem").
65. SISSELA BOK, SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION 252
(Vintage Books 1989) (emphasis added).
66. See discussion infra Part II.
67. See discussion infra Part III.
68. See discussion infra Part IV.
69. DON HENLEY, Dirty Laundry, on I CAN'T STAND STILL (Asylum 1982) (singing from
the perspective of a jaded and unscrupulous television news anchorperson along the lines of the
fictitious Ron Burgundy from the recent movie Anchorman) ("It's interesting when people die-
[g]ive us dirty laundry"); see Richard Harrington, The Princess of Rock Makes a Name for
Herself, WASH. POST, May 6, 2005, at T06 (describing Henley's song as an "'80s screed [that]
scours both tabloid mentality and celebrity culture").
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challenge the amorphous boundary that separates news from voyeurism in
2005.70 Is the sensational and sometimes exploitive coverage of death and
other tragedies by the media shaping the law when it comes to the
publication of images of the dead? Perhaps, this dubious coverage coupled
with the fact that, as the New York Times observed in May 2005,
"American confidence in the news media is at an all-time low," 71 will
influence the emerging jurisprudence of the privacy of death. In addition,
as images of death and the dead are transmitted and watched repeatedly on
television and on the Internet, technology compounds, if not expedites this
area of law.7' This concern was on the minds of Florida legislators when
they approved a bill that served familial privacy interests by substantially
limiting the disclosure of autopsy photographs.73
An illustration of the media's seeming obsession with death was the
wall-to-wall media spectacle of Terri Schiavo's passing in spring 2005, 74
and what can charitably be described as a televised pope deathwatch.
7 5
70. See Omar Jabara, The Vast Wasteland of Television News, DENV. POST, Apr. 3, 2005, at
E03 ("There's a saying that the media can't tell us what to think but they can tell us what to think
about. Are the things they have us thinking and talking about these days really news or just
manufactured crises and constitutionally protected voyeurism?"). Further, it is not just in the
United States that voyeurism and the media are increasingly linked. See Anne S. Y. Cheung,
Turning Victims into Defendants: A Study of Sex Scandals, SINGAPORE J. LEGAL STUD., Dec.
2004, at 329 (describing a "culture of mass voyeurism of the private lives of others" in China and
Taiwan).
71. Patrick D. Healy, Believe It: The Media's Credibility Headache Gets Worse, N.Y.
TIMES, May 22, 2005, at 4.
72. Graphic videotapes of beheadings in Iraq have been posted on Web sites. See Clint
Williams & Don Plummer, Captors Behead American Hostage, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Sept. 21,
2004, at IA (describing how a videotape depicting the beheading of Eugene Armstrong of
Hillsdale, Michigan, was "posted on an Internet Web site used by Islamic militants"); Joan Ryan,
Is This War, or Ghastly Reality TV?, S.F. CHRON., May 13, 2004, at BI ("[A]nother horrific
image landed in our living rooms. Five masked captors are seen on video about to behead a 26-
year-old American communications worker from Pennsylvania named Nick Berg. The full video,
available on the Internet, shows the killer holding up Berg's head like a trophy.") (emphasis
added).
73. A Florida appellate court, considering the constitutionality of this law, examined the
legislative history behind it:
The Legislature notes that the existence of the World Wide Web and the
proliferation of personal computers throughout the world encourages and promotes
the wide dissemination of photographs and video and audio recordings 24 hours a
day and that widespread unauthorized dissemination of autopsy photographs and
video and audio recordings would subject the immediate family of the deceased to
continuous injury.
Campus Commc'ns, Inc. v. Earnhardt, 821 So. 2d 388, 393 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
74. See Leonard Pitts Jr., Sometimes God Says No, BALT. SuN, Apr. 3, 2005, at 5C
("Watching the increasingly naked desperation of the fight to keep Mrs. Schiavo alive came to
feel intrusive and voyeuristic. You wanted to turn away, but there was no place you could go.").
75. Peter Johnson, Succession is the Story Now, USA TODAY, Apr. 4, 2005, at D4 ("Cable
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Writing about the Schiavo coverage, media critic Howard Kurtz stated,
"[d]oes anyone seriously believe Congress would have passed a law
affecting only Schiavo had television not assaulted us with the endless loop
of her in a hospital bed?, 76 Kurtz adds that:
Schiavo's passing merged seamlessly into the next death watch
as Pope John Paul II entered the hospital, triggering coverage so
intense that a Fox News anchor, reacting to a producer's error,
pronounced the pontiff dead more than 24 hours early. The
passing of the pope, which touched millions around the world,
was a huge story, but as the days wore on with little new to
report, the constant stream of religious leaders and theologians
became part of a round-the-clock canonization that had even
some Catholics questioning whether enough was enough. 7
Kurtz wasn't the only press commentator to notice the news media's
increasing fascination with death and its exploitation of death for ratings.
Columnist Frank Rich wrote in April 2005 in the New York Times:
Mortality-the more graphic, the merrier-is the biggest thing
going in America. Between Terri Schiavo and the pope, we've
feasted on decomposing bodies for almost a solid month now.
The carefully edited, three-year-old video loops of Ms. Schiavo
may have been worthless as medical evidence but as necro-pom
their ubiquity rivaled that of TV's top entertainment franchise,
the all-forensics-all-the-time "CSI." To help us visualize the
dying John Paul [II], another Fox star, Geraldo Rivera, brought
on Dr. Michael Baden, the go-to cadaver expert from the
JonBenet Ramsey, Chandra Levy and Laci Peterson mediathons,
to contrast His Holiness's cortex with Ms. Schiavo' S.78
The comments of sagacious media commentators like Kurtz and Rich
add weight to the arguments made in this article.
Stories about ordinary people have also raised questions about the
news went wall-to-wall all weekend with coverage of the pope's decline. Friday, Fox News
reported the pope's death prematurely after a producer, monitoring Italian reports, shouted into an
open microphone during anchor Shepard Smith's newscast. Smith apologized to viewers about
35 minutes later."); see also Michael Sappol, Why the Dead Are a Killer Act, L.A. TIMES, June
12, 2005, at M5 (commenting on the media's fascination with death today) ("Some critics have
dismissed the wave of anatomical exhibitions as faddish sensationalism and voyeurism. But the
spectacles are part of a larger cultural trend. Films, television shows and novels now regularly
feature hyper-realistic depictions of dead and mutilated bodies, and often the interior of such
bodies.").
76. Howard Kurtz, It's to Laugh (or Cry) About, WASH. POST, May 8, 2005, at B 1.
77. Id.
78. Frank Rich, A Culture of Death, Not Life, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2005, at 13.
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news media's coverage of the dying. For example, on September 11, 2001
"NBC ran one clip of a man plunging to his death, and then admitted it was
a mistake."7 9  Further, in October 2004, the Boston Herald published,
according to one veteran journalist, "lurid photos"' 80 of a young woman
"sprawled bleeding on the pavement'81 after she was hit by a police-fired
projectile following the Boston Red Sox World Series victory. The woman
would later die from the injuries.82 Images of the dead from the war in Iraq
also have drawn attention and criticism due to their graphic nature.
83
According to Robert Alt, the publication of death images from Iraq was
"macabre voyeurism-masquerading-as-news [reflected] by the media
response to the tragic events in Fallujah, during which four American
contractors were killed and their bodies desecrated not once, but a thousand
times over on the evening news and in the morning papers. 84
The bottom line, as described by a St. Louis Post-Dispatch reporter, is
that "[t]he media [is] under fire from the left and the right, from anti-war
protesters to those who plan wars in the White House." 85 Is it no surprise
that they may also come under legal fire from the relatives of the dead,
suing to protect images of their deceased loved ones? The American news
media is starting to lack credibility 86 and as a consequence, it is likely to be
reigned in by the law for its transgressions and abuses. Concomitantly, the
privacy rights pertaining to images of the dead are likely to grow as the
media's rights to access and publish them recedes.
79. Jonah Goldberg, Media Missteps, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, May 7, 2004, http://www.nation
alreview.com/goldberg/goldberg20045O7O940.asp.
80. Janet Kolodzy, Pack Journalism: Seen From Two Sides, Darkly, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Nov. 9, 2004, at 9.
81. Id.
82. See Kevin Cullen & Heather Allen, O'Toole Defends Crowd-Control Measures,
BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 22, 2004, at B5 (describing how the incident "left a young person dead")
("[T]he victim, Victoria Snelgrove, a 21 -year-old Emerson College student, was struck in the eye
socket, the only part of her body where the pepper spray round could penetrate and cause a fatal
injury.").
83. See generally Lori Robertson, Images of War, AM. JOURNALISM REV., Oct.-Nov. 2004,
at 46 ("In April 2004 the public saw the mutilated, burned and beaten bodies of four American
contractors in Fallujah; the rows of flag-draped coffins coming home from Iraq; and the
unfathomable images of the abuse and humiliation of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib.").
84. Robert Alt, Flaunting Fallujah, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, Apr. 29, 2004, at http://www.nati
onalreview.com/alt/alt20040290834.asp.
85. Michael D. Sorkin, Media Reform Advocates Meet Here, Criticize News Providers, ST.
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, May 13, 2005, http://www.commondreams.org/cgi-blu/print.cgi?file=/he
adlines05/0513-0.htm.
86. See Alexandra Marks, Media Mea Culpas Don't End Public Discontent, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Jan. 12, 2005, at 03 ("[Tlhe media, with all their foibles and strengths, continue to lose
credibility with the public even as they strive to correct errors.").
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There is evidence that sensationalistic journalism practices are
influencing judicial decision-making in this area. The evidence is found in
the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in the Favish case involving the death-
scene photographs of Vincent Foster. 7 In Favish, the Court held that
Foster's relatives had a personal privacy interest against the release of the
photographs. The Court wrote that "[t]hey seek to be shielded by the
exemption to secure their own refuge from a sensation-seeking culture for
their own peace of mind and tranquility. ,,88 However, the news media
nourish, feed, and satiate the sensation-seeking culture avidly attended by
television viewers.89 Justice Kennedy cited favorably the declaration of
Foster's sister, Sheila Foster Anthony, in which she wrote, "I fear that the
release of [additional] photographs certainly would set off another round of
intense scrutiny by the media. Undoubtedly, the photographs would be
placed on the Internet for world consumption. Once again my family
would be the focus of conceivably unsavory and distasteful media
coverage."90 The media, in brief, were very much on the mind of the Court
in reaching the conclusion that the concept of personal privacy of
Exemption 7(C) of FOIA swept up the relatives of the deceased and was
not limited, as Favish had contended, to "control information about
oneself."91
Similarly, the Court of Appeals of New York, in March 2005,
specifically cited the media's propensity for exploitation when it ruled that
the dying words of 911 emergency callers on September 11, 2001, were
protected from public disclosure.92 The appellate court reasoned that:
[I]t is highly likely in this case-more than in almost any other
imaginable-that, if the tapes and transcripts are made public,
they will be replayed and republished endlessly, and that in
some cases they will be exploited by media seeking to deliver
sensational fare to their audience. This is the sort of invasion
that the privacy exception exists to prevent.
93
In other cases involving images of the dead, the media's propensity
87. See supra notes 12-198 and accompanying text.
88. Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 166 (2004).
89. See Jim Heid, My Sister's Dead Body is No Longer News, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 17, 2001,
at 12 ( "Viewers' morbid curiosity draws them in, and sensational reporting and graphic images
keep them there.").
90. Favish, 541 U.S. at 167 (emphasis added).
91. Id. at 165.
92. Supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
93. N.Y. Times Co. v. City of N.Y. Fire Dep't, 829 N.E.2d 266, 270 (N.Y. 2005) (emphasis
added).
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for exploiting death has factored into the judicial decision making process.
In 1991, a Florida appellate court allowed a case to proceed to trial after a
television station shot and later aired a close-up of the local police chief
removing the decedent-victim's skull from an evidence box.9 4 The
appellate court determined that "[w]e have no difficulty in concluding that
reasonable persons in the community could find that the alleged conduct of
Channel 2 was outrageous in character and exceeded the bounds of decency
so as to be intolerable in a civilized community." 95 The court specifically
noted that "[t]he close-up of the skull was intentionally included to create
sensationalism for the report. The close-up was gruesome and macabre,
and was broadcast to thousands of viewers ....,,96
Similarly, a California appellate court in 1986 considered a case
where the wife of a man whose dying moments were captured by a
television camera in the couple's apartment without her consent was later
broadcast by an NBC station in Los Angeles.97 The court held that she had
successfully stated causes of action both for invasion of privacy and for
intentional infliction of emotional distress.98 In upholding these claims, the
court wrote that the facts of the case illustrate
a widespread loss of certainty about where public concerns end
and private life begins, and a loss of personal identity
manifested by individual members of the public when
confronted by aggressive media representatives. Personal
security in a society saturated daily with publicity about its
members requires protection not only from governmental
intrusion, but some basic bulwark of defense against private
commercial enterprises which derive profits from gathering and
disseminating information.99
Similar to the jury, the California appellate court sympathized with
the plaintiff-wife. 100 The court remarked that "the last moments of her
dying husband's life were filmed and broadcast to the world without any
regard for the subsequent protestations of both plaintiffs to the defendants.
94. See Armstrong v. H & C Commc'ns, Inc., 575 So. 2d 280, 283 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1991) (reversing "the trial court's dismissal of the Armstrongs' action based on the tort of
outrage").
95. Id. at 282.
96. Id. at 281.
97. Miller v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 670 (Ct. App. 1986).
98. Id. at 685 (holding that plaintiff "has stated three causes of action [including invasion of
privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress] against defendants and that since there are
triable issues of material fact, the trial court erred in awarding summary judgment .
99. Id. at 682 (emphasis added).
100. Id. at 685.
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Again, the defendants' lack of response to these protestations suggests an
alarming absence of sensitivity and civility."'
0'
In summary, the news media's sensational coverage of both the
images of the dead and the words of the dying is influencing the emerging
jurisprudence of the privacy of death. We live in a time when modem
journalism requires what the editor-in-chief of U.S. News & World Report
recently called "action images and boffo pictures."'0 2 Indeed, the phrase
"'[i]f it bleeds, it leads"' has become "a time-worn TV newsroom
clich.' ' 0 3 When the bleeding is over, the so-called "boffo pictures"
remaining are those of the dead,'04 and the decedent's family members
have the opportunity to suppress their publication, then the climate is ripe
to develop the law surrounding the privacy of death.
The next part of this article addresses this emerging area of
jurisprudence that intertwines statutory freedom of information laws with
the tort privacy causes of action and constitutional concerns about freedom
of speech.
III. GLIMPSES OF DEATH AND LEGAL DISPUTES: THE CHANGING SHAPE
OF THE LAW
A. Privacy and Death: Whose Right Is It Anyway?
It is useful to begin the legal analysis by considering two questions,
both of which relate to the individual who could possess privacy interests
in the area of privacy-of-death jurisprudence.
First, do the dead possess privacy interests in suppressing the
publication of certain images and words related to their death?'0 5
Typically, the answer is no 106 as the precedent supporting such a right is
101. Id. at 682 (emphasis added).
102. Mortimer B. Zuckerman, Why TV Holds Us Hostage, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb.
28, 2005, at 76.
103. Id.
104. Perhaps the most infamous of such photographs dates back long ago to 1928 when the
Daily News published on its front page a photograph of Ruth Snyder captured at the moment of
her death in an electric chair at Sing Sing prison. See Mark Fitzgerald, Final Exposure: Should
Newspapers Publish Graphic Execution Photos?, EDITOR & PUBLISHER MAG., Apr. 24, 2000, at
28-29 (describing the Snyder incident).
105. Of course, such interests are those that survive death and can be legally enforceable on
their behalf by living relatives.
106. Fasching v. Kallinger, 510 A.2d 694, 701 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986) ("The
general rule is: the right of privacy dies with the individual. The right of privacy is a personal
right and cannot, as a general rule, be asserted by anyone other than the person whose privacy is
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scarce. Indeed, when such precedent exists, it is usually derived from a
statute 7 rather than from the common law. The overwhelming weight of
authority suggests that the common law right of privacy does not survive
an individual's death. 0 8 For instance, California's appellate courts have
held that "the purely personal right of privacy dies with the person"'0 9 and
that "a claim of right to privacy is personal and cannot be asserted by
anyone other than the person whose privacy has been invaded. The claim
dies with the person."' 10  This mirrors the notion in libel law that one
cannot defame the dead:"' when a defamatory statement about a person is
published after that person's death, the family of the defamed decedent
cannot maintain a libel action on behalf of the decedent." 2 This is quite
logical-a person's death provides the person with the unfortunate but
ultimate escape from any emotional harm that the media might cause.
In the absence of a statute to the contrary, the fact that an individual's
right of privacy does not survive his or her death and is not descendible to
heirs does not end the inquiry in privacy-of-death jurisprudence. Indeed,
invaded.") (citation omitted).
107. PEMBER & CALVERT, supra note 26, at 265 (noting that "legislatures in several states
have passed statutes guaranteeing to heirs the right to protect the commercial exploitation of dead
public figures for as long as 50 years" regarding the right of publicity and misappropriation of an
individual's name or likeness). See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1 (2005) (providing for a
statutory right of publicity in a "deceased personality's name, voice, signature, photograph, or
likeness" that is freely transferable as a property right and that extends "70 years after the death of
the deceased personality"); NEV. REV. STAT. § 597.790(1) (2004) ( "There is a right of publicity
in the name, voice, signature, photograph or likeness of every person. The right endures for a
term consisting of the life of the person and 50 years after his death, regardless of whether the
person commercially exploits the right during his lifetime.").
108. Lawson v. Meconi, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 74, at *18-22 (Ct. of Chancery May 27,
2005) (examining and describing the state of the law on this issue).
109. Miller v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 680 (Ct. App. 1986); see also
Hendrickson v. Cal. Newspapers, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 429, 431 (Ct. App. 1975) ("[Ilt is well
settled that the right of privacy is purely a personal one; it cannot be asserted by anyone other
than the person whose privacy has been invaded, that is, plaintiff must plead and prove that his
privacy has been invaded. Further, the right does not survive but dies with the person.")
(citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
110. Marich v. QRZ Media, Inc., 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 406, 419 (Ct. App. 1999) (depublished).
111. See Raymond Iryami, Note, Give the Dead Their Day in Court: Implying a Private
Cause of Action for Defamation of the Dead from Criminal Libel Statutes, 9 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1083, 1083 (1999) ("[C]ommon law courts have steadfastly refused to
provide a private cause of action for defamation of the dead.").
112. See, e.g., Fasching v. Kallinger, 510 A.2d 694, 701 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986)
(stating that "a decedent's estate may continue a defamation suit, but only for injuries to
reputation occurring while the decedent was alive" and noting, with regard to the case at bar, that
"[b]ecause the allegedly defamatory statements in this case were published subsequent to Maria
Fasching's death, the action did not accrue during her lifetime and cannot be maintained by an
administrator of her estate.").
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the relatives of the dead may sustain injuries of their own. Injuries to their
own sense of privacy and emotional tranquility may arise from media
publication of images of their dead family members and next of kin. These
injuries are necessarily sustained after the death of the relative, when the
images of death and/or dying words are either published or sought for
publication. In other words, the harm in question need not be to the
deceased, but to the deceased's immediate relatives.' 13 Courts sometimes
have referred to this as a relational right of privacy because it seeks to
protect people from suffering the unhappiness of unwanted publicity about
their deceased relatives. 114  Therefore, "[a] cause of action asserted by a
close relative is sometimes called a 'relational' right to privacy."'1 15
The growth of privacy-of-death jurisprudence depends largely upon
whether the relatives of the dead possess a judicially recognized privacy
right of their own sufficient to suppress and punish the release of images
that are not about themselves but about their deceased loved ones.
Although the United States Supreme Court recognized such a privacy
interest in Favish,'16 courts do not universally agree on the existence of a
relational right of privacy in all or even most circumstances. 17  In fact,
"[u]nder the majority view, the deceased's relatives may not maintain an
action for invasion of privacy, either based on their own privacy interests
or as a representative for the deceased ... As a California appellate
113. See Bazemore v. Savannah Hosp., 155 S.E. 194, 195 (Ga. 1930) (involving the
unauthorized publication in a newspaper of a deceased infant child that was born with its heart on
the outside of its body); id at 197 ("In this case the child was dead when the unauthorized acts
were committed, and the right of action could not be in the child, but in the parents.").
114. Metter v. Los Angeles Exam'r, 95 P.2d 491, 495 (Cal. Ct. App. 1939).
115. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 200 S.E.2d 127, 130 (Ga. 1973), rev'd on other grounds,
420 U.S. 469 (1975). There are other uses in the law of the term "relational privacy" that apply to
relationships among living people, particularly family members, and do not only apply to the
living and dead-relative relationships. For instance, Associate Professor Radhika Rao of the
University of California, Hastings College of the Law, wrote in 2000 that:
the right of relational privacy casts a mantle of immunity from state interference
around intimate and consensual relationships, but it does not necessarily shield
commercial transactions between strangers, nor does it apply to object
relationships. Relational privacy governs the realm of affective ties rather than
arms-length exchange, providing constitutional shelter to personal relationships
rather than commercial transactions or object relationships.
Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L. REv. 359, 456 (2000).
116. Supra notes 12-198 and accompanying text.
117. Young v. That Week That Was The Week That Was, 312 F. Supp. 1337, 1340 (N.D.
Ohio 1969) ("Virtually all the cases which have passed upon this question ... have held that an
individual has no cause of action for invasion of his privacy, where the defendant published
information concerning the individual's deceased relative." [To bolster this viewpoint, the court
added that "[a] few cases are occasionally cited as recognizing a so-called 'relational' right of
privacy." Id. at 1341, n.2 (emphasis added)]).
118. Justice v. Belo Broad. Corp., 472 F. Supp. 145, 147 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (emphasis
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court once wrote, "[w]here the plaintiffs only relation to the asserted
wrong is that he is a relative of the victim of the wrongdoer, and was
unwillingly brought into the limelight, no recovery can be had. ' 19 In other
words, not all alleged injuries to relational privacy will be sufficient or
serious enough to pass judicial muster.
In the United States, we are "accustomed to thinking about privacy as
a personal right." 120 However, "[t]he extent to which privacy is a personal
right has been in contention for a long time ... ,,121 The privacy-of-death
jurisprudence challenges our "traditionally understood"' 122 notions of
privacy as "a personal right that may not be unreasonably infringed
upon"'123 because the law is forced to consider relational privacy interests of
relatives in the images and words of the deceased. This emerging
jurisprudence treats privacy as "a kind of social good"'124 rather than as an
individual right. By protecting families from media exploitation and public
voyeurism, privacy of death jurisprudence draws a line that the press may
not cross. This form of jurisprudence furthers the societal interests of
maintaining the dignity of the deceased and of protecting the grieving of
relatives. While lobbying against the release of her late husband's autopsy
photographs, the widow of racecar driver Dale Earnhardt stated,
The deceased have a right to their dignity and loved ones have a
right to be free from exploitation .... Allowing access to these
photos will only cause more distress and emotional harm. I'm
sure every family in America can understand this. Even people
in the public eye have a right to privacy. This right is more
important than the desire to exploit a tragic situation, especially
when no public good is being served.
125
Due to these fundamental shifts in the right to privacy, the remainder
of the article discusses and analyzes the developing privacy-of-death
jurisprudence. In particular, Part III.B describes the various causes of
added).
119. Hendrickson v. Cal. Newspapers, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 429, 431 (Ct. App. 1975).
120. Annas, supra note 4, at 504.
121. Jonathan M. Winer, Regulating the Free Flow of Information: A Privacy Czar as the
Ultimate Big Brother, 19 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 37, 43 (2000).
122. Vera Bergelson, It's Personal But Is It Mine? Toward Property Rights in Personal
Information, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 379, 403 (2003).
123. Id.
124. Paul M. Schwartz & William M. Treanor, The New Privacy, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2163,
2179 (2003) (reviewing JOHN GILLIOM, OVERSEERS OF THE POOR: SURVEILLANCE, RESISTANCE
AND THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY (2001)).
125. Dustin Long, Widow: Photos Should Stay Private, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS
(Va.), Mar. 5, 2001, at B5.
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action and theories upon which privacy-of-death litigation may be
grounded. Part III.C addresses case law that has recognized the privacy
rights of relatives of the deceased.
B. Suppression and Punishment
Privacy-of-death litigation may arise in two basic ways: before-
publication disputes and after-publication disputes. Notably, it is
analogous to the First Amendment distinction between prior restraints on
speech1 26 and subsequent punishments. 127 Current court battles that arise
over images and words of the deceased involve efforts aimed at either:
1. Suppression of Publication. This occurs when a relative of the
deceased or a government entity objects to a request or motion. 28 A
motion to suppress publication is most likely filed by a member of the news
media, but may be filed by a private citizen in his or her own capacity.
129
Private citizens are usually seeking production of photographs, videotapes,
or transcripts under a state or federal freedom of information statute; or
2. Punishment of Publication. This usually occurs when a relative of
the deceased files a civil lawsuit based upon the publication, transmission,
or dissemination of a photograph, videotape, or other image or recording of
the deceased. The relative typically brings a cause of action for public
disclosure of private facts 130 or intentional infliction of emotional
126. Cooper v. Dillon, 403 F.3d 1208, 1215 (1 1th Cir. 2005) ("A prior restraint on speech
prohibits or censors speech before it can take place."); United States v. Frandsen, 212 F.3d 1231,
1236-37 (1 1th Cir. 2000) ("A prior restraint on expression exists when the government can deny
access to a forum for expression before the expression occurs."); ZELEZNY, supra note 25, at 47
("[P]rior restraint is considered the worst kind of abridgment, and it is permitted only in rare
situations when harmful expression could not adequately be punished after the fact.").
127. See Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 553-54 (1993) (describing how the U.S.
Supreme Court's "decisions have steadfastly preserved the distinction between prior restraints
and subsequent punishments"); KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, FIRST
AMENDMENT LAW 368 (2d. ed. 2003) (observing that there is "special hostility to prior restraint
as distinguished from subsequent punishment.").
128. An example of a private citizen filing such a request seeking images of the dead is
journalism professor Ralph Begleiter's federal Freedom of Information Act request seeking
images of closed caskets of U.S. military personnel killed in Iraq. Supra notes 36-38 and
accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 37-42.
130. Shulman v. Group W. Prods., 955 P.2d 469, 478 (Cal. 1998) (noting that there are four
basic elements to this privacy tort: (1) publicity; (2) about a private fact; (3) that is offensive to a
reasonable person; and (4) that is not newsworthy or of legitimate public concern); see Porten v.
Univ. of San Francisco, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839, 841 (Ct. App. 1976) (stating that publicity means
"communication to the public in general or to a large number of persons as distinguished from
one individual or a few").
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distress. 
31
Recent examples of privacy-of-death litigation in the suppression of
publication category include (1) Favish, in which the immediate relatives
of Vincent Foster successfully objected to a federal FOIA request filed by a
private citizen for the government production of death-scene photographs
of Foster,132 (2) Providence Journal Co. v. Town of West Warwick,133 in
which a newspaper unsuccessfully sought under Rhode Island's Access to
Public Records Act tapes of the 911 police emergency telephone calls made
by victims who perished in a fire during a concert at a club, 134 and (3) New
York Times Co. v. City of New York Fire Dept.,35 in which the plaintiff
newspaper sought, under a state freedom of information law, over the
objection of New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg, 136 the tapes of
calls made on Sept. 11, 2001 to the fire department's 911 emergency
service to see how well the city responded to the terrorist attacks that
day. 
137
In each of these three cases, the objecting parties cited and used a
personal privacy exemption in their efforts to suppress the release of
photographs and dying declarations of the deceased. For instance, New
York's Freedom of Information Law exempts from disclosure, documents
that "would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.
131. Jordan v. State ex rel. Dep't of Motor Vehicles & Pub. Safety, 110 P.3d 30, 52 (Nev.
2005) (holding that the basic elements of a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress are "(1) extreme and outrageous conduct with either the intention of, or reckless disregard
for, causing emotional distress; (2) severe or extreme emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff,
and (3) actual or proximate causation").
132. See supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text.
133. No. 03-2697, 2004 R.I. Super. LEXIS 136 (R.I. Super. Ct. 2004).
134. Id. at *6-7 (in rejecting the newspaper's request for these tapes and citing a privacy
exemption to Rhode Island's open records act, the trial court judge wrote that "[t]hese calls are
intensely personal and are intimately intertwined with the Station fire tragedy as it was unfolding.
These communications are entitled to protection whether initiated by victims or family members
to avoid a highly intrusive interference with the legitimate privacy entitlement these individuals
should be afforded.").
135. 829 N.E.2d 266 (N.Y. 2005).
136. See Michael Cooper, City and Times Argue in Court Over Firefighters' 9/11 Accounts,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2005, at B4 (describing the legal fight over the transcripts of the calls, and
writing that "[t]he Bloomberg administration initially sought to withhold all the material sought
by The Times. Now the city says it is willing to release much of it but wants to remove portions.
The city argues that the release of some of the material would violate the privacy of victims and
their families.").
137. See New York Times Co., 829 N.E.2d at 269-71 (writing that the "Fire Department
does not now oppose disclosure of the words spoken in the 911 calls by 911 operator" but
concluding "the public interest in the words of the 911 callers is outweighed by the interest in
privacy of those family members and callers who prefer that those words remain private.").
138. N.Y. PUB. OFF. § 87(2)(b) (2005).
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Likewise, Rhode Island's Access to Public Records Act provides an
exemption for documents that "could reasonably be expected to constitute
an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy . .,139 However, the Federal
Freedom of Information Act exemption at issue in Favish restrains
disclosure of "records or information compiled for law enforcement
purposes, but only to the extent that production of such law enforcement
records or information would... constitute an unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy."
' 140
It is important to note that, while each of these three exemptions are
phrased in terms of "personal privacy," each was invoked to protect the
privacy interests not just of the decedent about whom the information in
question pertained but also the relatives of the deceased. The word
"personal," in other words, may be interpreted and construed more broadly
to mean "familial." As the United States Supreme Court wrote in Favish,
"[t]he right to personal privacy is not confined, as Favish argues, to the
'right to control information about oneself."", 141 Instead, the Court found
that the term "personal privacy" included the privacy interests of Foster's
relatives in their "own right and interest to personal privacy. They seek to
be shielded by the exemption to secure their own refuge from a sensation-
seeking culture for their own peace of mind and tranquility, not for the sake
of the deceased.' 42 It is through such expansive statutory construction that
privacy-of-death jurisprudence will enlarge and develop.
As noted above, however, the current wave of privacy-of-death
disputes involves not only efforts to suppress and restrain publication of
photographs of the dead and transcripts of their dying words, but also
attempts to punish those who already have disclosed and published such
information. The First Amended Complaint filed in Showler v. Harper's
Magazine Foundation falls into the punishment-of-publication category.
143
In this case, the plaintiff-father and the state administrator based multiple
causes of action-intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of
privacy, unjust enrichment, and negligence-upon the facts surrounding
the capture and publication by Harper's of a photograph of the remains of a
National Guardsman in an open casket that were taken at the deceased's
funeral. 1 " According to the plaintiff's attorney, "the press were instructed
139. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 38-2-2(4)(i)(D)(c) (Supp. 2005).
140. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(7)(C) (2004).
141. Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 165 (2004).
142. Id. at 166 (emphasis added).
143. First Amended Complaint at 4, Showier v. Harper's Mag. Found., No. 05-CV-178-S
(E.D. Okla. filed June 14, 2005).
144. Id. at 6-7, 14-16 (setting forth these causes of action).
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not to take photographs during the funeral" but the Harper's photographer
violated the instruction by taking the photographs and publishing them.
1 45
Another punishment-of-publication case, filed in Washington State by
relatives of several decedents against non-media defendants, is Reid v.
Pierce County.146 It centered on claims for the torts of outrage-akin to
intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional
distress, and invasion of privacy-by employees of the Pierce County
Medical Examiner's Office. 147 For instance, one plaintiff was Karen Reid,
a niece of the late Washington Governor Dixie Lee Ray, who learned that
Ray's autopsy photograph was among those shown at cocktail parties and
used by at least one employee to create personal scrapbooks. 148 Although
the plaintiffs lost on their outrage 149 and negligent infliction of emotional
distress claims, largely because they were not present to see the autopsy
photos when they were exposed at the cocktail parties, 50 the Washington
Supreme Court nonetheless recognized that the plaintiffs may possess a
privacy interest and rejected the argument of the defendants to the
contrary.15' The court wrote
The County argues if any right of privacy was violated it was
that of the deceased and not of the relatives of the deceased.
The County asserts the general rule is that privacy is a personal
interest and may not be brought by a relative of a deceased
person. This argument, however, flies in the face of our
previous cases, legislation, and memoranda from the County
itself. 
52
The Supreme Court of Washington thus held in Reid that "the
immediate relatives of a decedent have a protectable privacy interest in the
autopsy records of the decedent. That protectable privacy interest is
grounded in maintaining the dignity of the deceased."'' 53  The court
145. Open-Casket Photo Sparks Privacy Suit Against Magazine, REP. COMMITTEE FOR
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, http://www.rcfp.org/news/2005/0620-pri-openca.html (June 20, 2005).
146. Reid v. Pierce County, 961 P.2d 333 (Wash. 1998).
147. Id. at 335.
148. Id.
149. See id at 338 ("Plaintiffs ... were simply not present when the conduct occurred. Even
if we were inclined to find the tort of outrage available to plaintiffs, we would be required to
overlook the presence element.").
150. See id ("None of the Plaintiffs were present at the scene where the tortious action
occurred and, therefore, are not entitled to maintain an action for negligent infliction of emotional
distress").
151. Id. at 343.
152. Reid v. Pierce County, 961 P.2d 333, 339 (Wash. 1998).
153. Id. at 342.
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concluded that the plaintiffs "may maintain a civil action for invasion of
privacy under the common law."' 154 In reaching this conclusion, the court
agreed with the reasoning of a Florida district court that held "'it may be
that a defendant's conduct towards a decedent will be found to be
sufficiently egregious to give rise to an independent cause of action in
favor of members of decedent's immediate family."1
55
Another punishment-of-publication case is Armstrong v. H & C
Communications, Inc.,' 56 a case described earlier, which involved the video
tape of a young murder victim's skull that later aired on the evening
news. 157 The Florida appellate court in that case allowed a claim of outrage
to go to trial but rejected a cause of action for public disclosure of private
facts because the discovery of the girl's remains "and their possession by
the police, were legitimate matters of public interest."' 5 8 The court rejected
the privacy claim not because the parents lacked a privacy interest to begin
with but rather because the image was newsworthy. 59 Specifically, the
court cited Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital, 60 a 1930 decision by the
Georgia Supreme Court, which upheld
a complaint by the parents of a deceased child against a hospital,
a photographer, and a newspaper for the unauthorized
publication of a picture of their malformed child, which had
been born with an external heart. It was alleged that the
unauthorized taking and publication of the photograph had
violated the parents' privacy rights, causing them humiliation
and disgrace.161
With this interpretation of the facts of Bazemore in mind, the
Armstrong court, some sixty-one years later, distinguished it from the
television station's airing of the murdered Florida girl's skull on the basis
that the birth of a malformed child "was a matter of private, not public,
concern." 1
62
Although the Bazemore opinion is now seventy-six years old, it is still
good law. In fact, it was cited favorably by the United States Supreme
154. Id. at 343.
155. Id. at 342 (quoting Loft v. Fuller, 408 So. 2d 619, 624 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
156. Armstrong v. H & C Commc'ns., Inc., 575 So. 2d 280 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
157. Supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
158. Armstrong, 575 So. 2d at 283.
159. Id. at 283 (citing as precedent the case of Bazemore v. Savannah Hosp., 155 S.E. 194
(Ga. 1930)).
160. Bazemore, 155 S.E. at 194.
161. Armstrong, 575 So. 2d at 283 (citing Bazemore, 155 S.E. at 194).
162. Id.
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Court in Favish to support the Court's finding of a well-established
common law tradition that acknowledges the privacy rights of family
members over images of their deceased loved ones. 163 By coupling the
Bazemore opinion with the Schuyler v. Curtis opinion,' 64 the Favish Court
resuscitated privacy-of-death jurisprudence.
With the privacy-of-death dichotomy between suppression of
publication and punishment of publication in mind, the next part turns to
the analysis of the courts that have recognized the privacy rights of
relatives in this area. An understanding of the policy justifications for the
recognition of this right are necessary in order to identify the set of factors
articulated in Part III and to address the issue of whether a qualified right of
privacy of immediate relatives yields to other competing interests.
C. The State of the Case Law and Judicial Analysis of the Interests and
Issues
What are the interests and injuries at stake that justify the existence of
a privacy-of-death jurisprudence and, in particular, relational privacy rights
in this emerging area of the law? The answer largely lies in a potent
combination of two elements: the dignity of the deceased and the resulting
injury to the emotional tranquility of the surviving relatives when that
dignity is violated through media publication and exploitation. For
instance, the Court of Appeals of New York upheld the privacy interests of
the relatives of those who perished in the World Trade Center towers on
Sept. 11, 2001 and whose dying words were recorded on emergency 911
telephone calls:
It is normal to be appalled if intimate moments in the life of
one's deceased child, wife, husband or other close relative
become publicly known, and an object of idle curiosity or a
source of titillation. The desire to preserve the dignity of
human existence even when life has passed is the sort of interest
to which legal protection is given under the name of privacy.
We thus hold that surviving relatives have an interest protected
by FOIL in keeping private the affairs of the dead. 1
65
Likewise, the Superior Court of Rhode Island, in justifying its
163. See Favish, 541 U.S. at 169 (citing the Bazemore opinion for "recognizing parents'
right of privacy in photographs of their deceased child's body").
164. Supra note 18 and accompanying text.
165. N.Y. Times Co. v. City of N.Y. Fire Dep't., 829 N.E.2d 266, 269 (N.Y. 2005)
(emphasis added); see supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text (discussing the Freedom of
Information Act).
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decision to prevent disclosure of certain emergency tapes of calls from
dying victims of a major fire, wrote that "[t]o allow access to victim/family
members [sic] calls would be at variance with the purpose of APRA which
recognizes the desirability of preserving individual dignity."'
166
Additionally, the Supreme Court of Washington in Reid v. Pierce County'
67
held that "the immediate relatives of a decedent have a protectable privacy
interest in the autopsy records of the decedent. That protectable privacy
interest is grounded in maintaining the dignity of the deceased."'
' 68
While it is the relatives who hold the protectable privacy interests in
these cases, the locus of the dignity that suffers injury may actually be with
the deceased, as in the Reid case noted above. 169  Similarly, in the case
involving the 911 emergency calls from the World Trade Center towers, it
was "[t]he desire to preserve the dignity of human existence even when life
has passed . ,,170
Not surprisingly, the dignity-of-the-dead concept is central to
relational privacy in the privacy-of-death jurisprudence and is gaining
increased, albeit contested, recognition in the law. This recognition may be
evidenced by Oregon's Death With Dignity Act, which "authorizes
physicians to prescribe lethal doses of controlled substances to terminally
ill Oregon residents according to procedures designed to protect vulnerable
patients and ensure that their decisions are reasoned and voluntary. 17'
That law, which in 2005 was under review by the United States Supreme
Court, suggests an increasing societal recognition of the important legal
relationship between death and dignity, as the very name of the law-the
Death with Dignity Act-illustrates. 72 Therefore, it follows that the debate
will spill over from discussions and litigation about the manner in which
one is entitled to die with dignity 173 to protection of that person's dignity
166. Providence Journal Co. v. Town of W. Warwick, No. 03-2697, 2004 R.I. Super.
LEXIS 136, at *7-8 (R.I. Super. Ct. 2004) (emphasis added).
167. Reid v. Pierce County, 961 P.2d 333 (Wash. 1998).
168. Id. at 342 (emphasis added).
169. Id.
170. N.Y. Times Co., 829 N.E.2d at 269 (emphasis added).
171. Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118, 1122 (9th Cir. 2004), aff'd, Gonzales v. Oregon,
126 S. Ct. 904 (2006).
172. See generally Betty Rollin, In the End, Peace of Mind, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2005, at
M5 (observing that oral argument in the U.S. Supreme Court considering the constitutionality of
Oregon's Death With Dignity law was scheduled for October 5, 2005, and noting that Oregon is
"the only state in the nation that gives you a choice about how and when to die").
173. The question of death-with-dignity was played out in the death of Terri Schiavo
discussed earlier in this article. See generally Paul Boudreaux, Powers Clash Over Schiavo Heart
and Mind Conflict, TAMPA TRIB. (Fla.), Mar. 27, 2005, at Commentary I ("The heart is unable to
speak with any intelligence either to medical science or to the legal claims regarding Schiavo's
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after death. From a privacy perspective, the only difference is that the
death-with-dignity debate over physician-assisted suicide centers on
privacy of choice in the decision-making process, while the privacy-of-
death jurisprudence centers on privacy of information in the release and
publication process.
In summary, the injury element in the privacy-of-death jurisprudence
is based upon the nexus between the dignity of the dead and the emotional
tranquility of the living.174  For instance, in Favish the United States
Supreme Court was careful to point out that the privacy interest of the
plaintiffs-the deceased's relatives-was "their own peace of mind and
tranquility .... This interest, in turn, could be harmed by what the
Court called "unwarranted public exploitation that, by intruding upon their
own grief, tends to degrade the rites and respect they seek to accord to the
deceased person who was once their own." 176  The phrase "rites and
respect"' 177 in that statement is tantamount to the dignity of "the deceased
person who was once their own."'1 78 In a nutshell, as one court put it more
than a century ago, the relatives of the dead seek "to prevent a violation of
their own rights in the character and memory of the deceased."
' 179
With the surviving relatives' privacy interests in mind, courts must
next determine whether their interests justify suppression or punishment for
publication in all cases involving death imagery and dying words of their
deceased relatives. This question is particularly relevant because, as a
Texas appellate court observed in 2001, "[p]hotographs of deceased
persons are not undignified per se, and generally cannot be said to violate
the deceased's dignity by mere publication."'' 80 In Cox Texas Newspapers
v. Wooten, which centered on a photograph of a dead woman published in
privacy right to die with dignity or her parents' right to keep her alive."). California also entered
the debate over the legal concept of death with dignity in the context of physician-assisted
suicide. See Nancy Vogel, Assembly Panel Approves Assisted-Suicide Bill, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 13,
2005, at B6 (describing how a "bill to allow terminally ill Californians to end their lives with
lethal prescriptions" was being considered in the California Assembly in 2005); Nancy Vogel,
Legislators Drop Suicide Bill for Now, L.A. TIMES, July 12, 2005, at B 1 (writing that the death
with dignity bill that had been pending in 2005 in the California Assembly "died quietly in the
California Legislature... with proponents still struggling against steady religious and cultural
currents").
174. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
175. Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 166 (2004).
176. Id. at 168.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Schuyler v. Curtis, 42 N.E. 22, 25 (N.Y. 1895).
180. Cox Tex. Newspapers v. Wooten, 59 S.W.3d 717, 722 (Tex. App. 2001) (emphasis
added).
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the Austin American Statesman, the court wrote that "the photograph of a
deceased woman in repose in a coffin, wearing a long white dress and a
crucifix, with her face concealed and her hands solemnly enfolding a
prayer book, is an image that accords both solemnity and dignity to the
subject."'' 81  In stark contrast to such a dignified image of death is a
photograph of a deformed, naked, and deceased infant born with his heart
outside his body, precisely the situation in Bazemore v. Savannah
Hospital.182
As applied to privacy-of-death jurisprudence, the comparison of the
Cox Texas Newspapers and Bazemore cases suggests that there is not
necessarily an affront to the dignity of the dead by publishing certain
postmortem images of them. Rather, the nature of the photograph in
question-precisely what it shows and how it portrays it-may be a pivotal
factor in determining the existence of a relational privacy violation. For
instance, it would be extremely difficult to conclude that any relational
privacy rights were violated by photojournalists who took and published
pictures of slain military personnel reposed inside pristine, closed flag-
draped coffins at Dover Air Force Base in Delaware. These are not, to put
it bluntly, graphic images of men and women with grotesque and lethal
wounds. 183  Yet, the government has imposed just such a ban because,
according to President George W. Bush, "banning the photography protects
the privacy of the families of the dead."' 184 While this executive policy has
been in place since 1991, the Pentagon has also issued its own directive to
ensure that "deceased military personnel [from the Iraqi conflict] returning
181. Id.
182. Bazemore v. Savannah Hosp., 155 S.E. 194, 195 (Ga. 1930); see Cox Broad. Corp. v.
Cohn, 200 S.E.2d 127, 131(Ga. 1973) (interpreting the Bazemore decision to stand for the
proposition that the "surviving parents' complaint properly stated a cause of action against the
newspaper" and that "the parents of the deceased infant had a cause of action against the
newspaper because of its public disclosure which affected them, the parents" after the newspaper
published "a photograph depicting their deformed infant").
183. Some people, in fact, argue that such photographs should be made public since they
actually honor the dead, rather than degrade their dignity, and facilitate the grieving process. As
the mother of a U.S. soldier killed in Iraq stated in a guest column in the Buffalo News:
The pictures of these solemn ceremonies at Dover and the flag-draped caskets
should be shown every night on the evening news and on the front page of every
newspaper-so all families can see and feel the loss each represents. The families
of the fallen need to know that we are not alone in our grief.
Karen Meredith, Military's Ban on Coffin Photos Hurts Families, BUFF. NEWS, Mar. 24, 2005, at
A8.
184. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Senate Backs Ban on Photos of G.I. Coffins, N.Y. TIMES, June
22, 2004, at AI7; see Michael Tracey, Public's Duty to See Policy Results, ROCKY MTN. NEWS,
May 1, 2004, at 14C ("The White House has claimed that they were protecting the dignity of the
dead and the privacy of their families, but many families were desperate for their lost to have
their moment on the evening news.") (emphasis added).
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to or departing from" airbases receive no news coverage.185
Courts deciding privacy-of-death issues need to conduct a case-by-
case, image-by-image examination of the precise details in each
photograph and recording at issue. Additionally, courts seem very
concerned with the circumstances that surround each death. In other
words, the violation concerns not only the image or recordings of the dead,
but also the events that gave rise to the death. For instance, in recognizing
relational privacy interests in the lawsuit pertaining to the nightclub fire in
West Warwick, Rhode Island,186 the trial court judge wrote that the request
by the Providence Journal for 91 -call recordings of the victims came "in
the wake of this unprecedented human tragedy."1 87 Similarly, the Court of
Appeals of New York, in acknowledging the privacy interests of relatives
of those who died in the World Trade Center as the result of the Al-Qaida
terrorist attacks, wrote
the September 11 callers were part of an event that has received
and will continue to receive enormous-perhaps literally
unequalled-public attention. Many millions of people have
reacted, and will react, to the callers' fate with horrified
fascination. Thus it is highly likely in this case-more than in
almost any other imaginable-that, if the tapes and transcripts
are made public, they will be replayed and republished
endlessly ....188
The New York court's language, as well as that of the Rhode Island
Superior Court in Providence Journal Company, suggests a potential
maxim: the more horrific, tragic, and unusual the circumstances
surrounding the death, the more likely courts will recognize the privacy
interests of relatives in the dignity of the dead. Such a maxim would be
consistent with the few cases recognizing relational privacy rights in false
light invasion of privacy claims; 189 courts have stressed that the
circumstances must be particularly "egregious."' 9°
185. Id. at A17.
186. Supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text (describing the case).
187. Providence Journal Co., No. 03-2697, 2004 R.I. Super. LEXIS 136, at *12.
188. N.Y. Times Co., 829 N.E.2d 266, 270 (N.Y. 2005).
189. See generally DOMINICK VETRI, TORT LAW AND PRACTICE 1022 (1998) (setting forth
the four basic elements of a false light privacy claim and writing that "[flalse light cases often are
much like defamation cases" but "may be independent of defamation only where the statement is
not quite derogatory enough to be defamatory, but still might be highly offensive to a reasonable
person and, therefore, be actionable as false light").
190. See, e.g., Tyne v. Time Warner Ent. Co., 336 F.3d 1286, 1292-93 (1 lth Cir. 2003),
certified question answered, 901 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 2005) (discussing relational privacy claims in
the context of false light invasion of privacy lawsuits and noting that, when allowed by courts,
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Another factor that courts may consider in deciding whether a
relational privacy interest exists in a particular case, trumping a request for
access to information about the dead, is the amount of time that has elapsed
since the deceased passed away. For instance, in April 2005, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine considered the privacy interests of deceased
persons and their families after a newspaper sought to obtain under a state
freedom of information law investigative records pertaining to eighteen
dead priests who allegedly molested minors.' 91 Although the case did not
deal with images of death or dying words, the court's reasoning on the
threshold question of relational privacy interests is relevant for privacy-of-
death jurisprudence:
Our in camera inspection of the records reveals that the passage
of time has substantially dissipated or extinguished the privacy
interests of the deceased priests, if any, and of their relatives.
The length of time from both the alleged misconduct by the
priests and their deaths is measured in decades, not years. The
median number of years since the priests' deaths is twenty-five,
and the average number of years since the acts of alleged abuse
exceeds forty. The earliest acts of abuse are alleged to have
occurred in the 1930s, and the most recent acts of abuse are
alleged to have occurred not later than 1983.192
This time-passage factor in the judicial calculus of privacy-of-death
jurisprudence indicates that the privacy interests of relatives are greatest
when little time has passed between the death of the loved one and the
request for access to information. As the court stated, disclosure of
information about the deceased is more likely to "adversely affect the peace
of mind of his or her family in the years immediately following death [and]
will have considerably less effect many years later."1 93 The logic here
presumes, at least in part, that the law will or should protect a fixed
grieving period for the surviving relatives of the publicized decedent after
which time the relations' privacy rights terminate. Thus, the Maine court
contrasted the request for information about the deceased priests with the
United States Supreme Court's analysis in Favish, writing that "[t]he threat
of the unwarranted public exploitation of grieving family members that was
central to the outcome in Favish is not present here."' 94
Indirect calls for legal recognition of a family's right to grieve in
they are based on rare circumstances).
191. Blethen Me. Newspapers, Inc. v. Maine, 871 A.2d 523, 525 (Me. 2005).
192. Id. at 531 (emphasis added).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 533.
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private and for general familial grieving periods permeate a 2005 civil
lawsuit filed in federal court in Oklahoma. This case, filed against
Harper's magazine, was based on the taking and publication of a
photograph of a deceased National Guard member in an open-casket
funeral.195 In opposition to a motion to dismiss the lawsuit, Douglass Stall,
the plaintiffs' attorney, argued that "Specialist Kyle Showler Brinlee's
family grieved over his lifeless body once at the funeral; and they have a
right to never again experience the unimaginable anguish of viewing his
remains." 196  The same brief later contends that the First Amendment's
Free Press Clause does not "allow the Defendants to invade the privacy of
the grieving family members."'197 The United States Supreme Court in
Favish wrote that "[f]amily members have a personal stake in honoring and
mourning their dead,"'198 conveying that there is a recognized grieving
period as a zone or sphere of familial privacy--one that is protected from
intrusion and exploitation.
With this background on the legal issues surrounding the privacy-of-
death jurisprudence in mind, the next part of this article turns to the tension
between protecting relational privacy rights and allowing the public access
to the images and, quite literally, voices of death.' 99 In particular, it
proposes six factors for courts to weigh and consider when attempting to
balance these interests.
IV. A QUALIFIED RIGHT OF RELATIONAL PRIVACY: STRIKING THE
PROPER BALANCE BETWEEN DIGNITY AND PUBLICITY
Many federal appellate courts have long recognized a qualified right
of privacy that allows journalists to keep their sources confidential in
situations other than those involving grand jury and special prosecutor
200subpoenas. However, the privilege can be overcome in certain
195. Supra notes 25-33 and accompanying text.
196. Plaintiffs' Brief in Support of Their Response and Objection to Defendant Harper's
Magazine Foundation's and Peter Turnley's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim for
Which Relief can be Granted at 1, Showier v. Harper's Magazine Found., No. 05-CV-178-S
(E.D. Okla. June 15, 2005) (emphasis added).
197. Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
198. Favish, 541 U.S. at 168 (emphasis added).
199. See generally Providence Journal Co., No. 03-2697, 2004 R.I. Super. LEXIS 136
(describing the interests balanced).
200. See Lee v. Dept. of Justice, 413 F.3d 53, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (describing the
recognition by United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit of a
"reporter's privilege in civil actions" that is "qualified, not absolute"); Laura R. Handman,
Protection Of Confidential Sources: A Moral, Legal And Civic Duty, 19 NOTRE DAME J. L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 573, 577 (2005) (writing that "[f]ederal courts have recognized a reporter's
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circumstances when the need to know the identity of a source outweighs
the privacy interest of the reporter-source relationship.20 '
Such a qualified privilege and right should be recognized in another
area of law. However, this time the privilege should not protect the press
but instead should be used to hinder and punish its newsgathering. Based
upon four key factors, it is sensible and sagacious for courts and
legislatures to recognize a relational right to privacy that would expand the
privacy-of-death jurisprudence. The four factors are 1) the reasoning of the
Favish decision that went beyond mere statutory analysis to favorably
acknowledge and recognize common law traditions regarding death and
privacy,20 2 2) the media's apparent fixation on death and its propensity to
publish sensational images, 20 3 3) the increasing societal concerns regarding
204 A hthe dignity of death and the dead in other contexts, and 4) the logic of the
cases described throughout this article that has recognized a relational right
of privacy to protect against either or both the release and publication of
images and words of death.
It is a propitious time to address the issue. Privacy has become "a
dominant theme in public policy in the United States.20 5 Debate about
relational privacy rights should be a part of this discussion. Legislative
bodies should adopt statutes recognizing a qualified right of privacy that
allow relatives of the deceased both to suppress access to images of death
and to punish those entities and individuals who exploit such imagery
through mass dissemination and publication.
Just as there is a tension between data privacy and free speech, 0 6
another contentious area of privacy law, there is a tension between death
privacy and free speech. Photographs of death and the dead may be
newsworthy, and the public may have a legitimate interest in viewing them.
207This issue raises First Amendment concerns of free press and expression.
privilege grounded in the First Amendment that provides journalists with a qualified right to resist
efforts to compel testimony about their confidential sources or about unpublished information
gained in the course of researching a story").
201. See generally DAY, supra note 63, at 175-86 (providing helpful background on both
the ethical and legal issues and policy considerations involving journalists' promises of
confidentiality to their sources).
202. Supra notes 11-17 and accompanying text.
203. Supra Part II.
204. Supra notes 161-163 and accompanying text.
205. Anita L. Allen, Privacy Isn't Everything: Accountability as a Personal and Social
Good, 54 ALA. L. REv. 1375, 1375 (2003).
206. See generally Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment,
52 UCLA L. REv. 1149 (2005) (discussing this tension).
207. For example, when the Columbus Dispatch ran a photograph of a dead U.S. soldier
killed in Iraq on its front page in November 2003, it was justified on the ground that "it's
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Thus, the relational privacy right must be qualified rather than an absolute
or impenetrable barrier. Therefore, when issues arise, such as the release of
autopsy photographs that might serve a public purpose, °8 some legislative
bodies have adopted specific factors that judges must consider in deciding
whether there is good cause to release the autopsy photographs.
20 9
With this in mind, courts should balance specific factors whenever
there is a statutory request made to a government entity for images (or
voices) of death. Using a totality of the circumstances approach, a court
should consider whether: (a) government officials or close relatives of the
deceased object to disclosure on grounds that the relatives' privacy
interests will be harmed by the publicity surrounding publication of the
photos or tapes; or (b) the relatives of the deceased file a civil lawsuit, in
which the relatives claim that their own interests in privacy and/or
emotional tranquility have been harmed by the publicity given to post-life
images or the dying words of their loved ones.
This article proposes numerous factors that courts should consider
when weighing the strength of the relational privacy interest of relatives
against the public's right to have access to the visual and auditory details of
death and the dead. These factors are drawn not only from the logic of the
cases discussed earlier but also from the basic principles of the tort of
sometimes necessary to run a photo with such a terrible, gruesome story to bring the gravity of
the situation home." Benjamin J. Marrison, Photos of Dead Used Sparingly, if Newsworthy,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Ohio), Nov. 30, 2003, at lB. Another editor added, "I felt that if we
don't occasionally show the starkness, the tragedy, the bleak nature of war, we really aren't
communicating the whole story to the readers." Id. In brief, there are justifications for publishing
some images of death that may, in some circumstances, trump privacy interests.
208. For instance, the Orlando Sentinel sought the autopsy photographs of Dale Earnhardt
for the specific purpose of trying to determine what caused his death and, in particular, whether
the use of a particular head and neck support device could have saved his life. See Terry Blount,
Two Sides to Earnhardt Autopsy Furor, HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 10, 2001, at Sports 11 (reporting
that "[tihe Sentinel editors have stated they have no intention of printing the photographs, but
instead want to have their own medical expert look at the photos and make certain the Volusia
County, Fla., medical examiner correctly reported the cause of death" and quoting the Sentinel's
editor for the proposition that "we believe there's interest about the question of NASCAR
safety"); Jerry F. Boone, Information in Autopsy Photos Could Help Prevent More Deaths,
OREGONIAN (Portland, Or.), Mar. 15, 2001, at D07 (contending that "the Orlando Sentinel's
experts should be allowed to look at the autopsy photos from Dale Earnhardt's fatal crash"
because it may help prevent such tragedies in the future had it turned out that a safety device
could have saved his life).
209. For instance, Indiana law requires a judge to consider four factors in such a good-cause
policy determination, including: "(1) whether the disclosure is necessary for the public evaluation
of governmental performance; (2) the seriousness of the intrusion into the family's right to
privacy; (3) whether the disclosure of the photograph, video recording, or audio recording is by
the least intrusive means available; and (4) the availability of similar information in other public
records, regardless of form." IND. CODE ANN. § 16-39-7.1-4(b) (Supp.2004).
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public disclosure of private facts. 2'0  The factors are to be considered
holistically, with no single factor controlling or weighing more than any
other.
1. Time Passage- The Length of Time Since Death
This factor is drawn from the logic of the Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine in its 2005 opinion Blethen Maine Newspapers, Inc. v. Maine,
21
1
discussed in Part 111.212 The greater the amount of time that has passed
since the death of the individual depicted in the death-scene photo, autopsy
image, or dying-words audiotape, the less interest and justification exist for
protecting the privacy interests of the relatives. Accordingly, there is an
inverse or negative correlation 213 between the variables of time and
privacy: the greater the length of time that has passed, the lesser the
privacy interest. Relatives are entitled to a period of grief, but eventually
that period must close in the name of the public's right to know. The
precise amount of time when the interest in grief surrenders to the interest
in public access is a flexible determination for judges. The determination
should take into account factors such as expert testimony of grief
counselors, the relatives' own testimony, and the manner of the death itself
(assuming that some manners of death are less traumatic than others).
2. Circumstances of Death - The Gravity of Events
This factor is drawn from several opinions discussed earlier,
214
including New York Times Co. v. City of New York Fire Dept.215 and
Providence Journal Co. v. Town of West Warwick:216  The more
horrendous and extraordinary the circumstances surrounding the death of
210. See generally KENT R. MIDDLETON & WILLIAM E. LEE, THE LAW OF PUBLIC
COMMUNICATION 182-192 (2006) (describing some of the basic principles of the tort of public
disclosure of private facts).
211. Blethen Me. Newspapers, Inc. v. Maine, 871 A.2d 523 (Me. 2005).
212. Supra notes 191-194 and accompanying text.
213. A negative relationship is "[a] relationship in which the variables change in the
opposite directions. For example, if as variable A increases, variable B decreases, their
relationship is negative." LISA J. MCINTYRE, NEED TO KNOW: SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH
METHODS 299 (2005) (emphasis in original). See generally GUIDO H. STEMPEL, III, ET AL.,
MASS COMMUNICATION RESEARCH AND THEORY 158-59 (2003) (discussing the concepts of
correlation, positive correlation, and negative correlation as used in communication and social
science research).
214. Supra notes 163-164 and accompanying text.
215. N.Y. Times Co. v. City of N.Y. Fire Dep't., 829 N.E.2d 266 (N.Y. 2005).
216. Providence Journal Co. v. Town of W. Warwick, No. 03-2697 2004 R.I. Super. LEXIS
136 (R.I. Super. Ct. 2004).
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the individual, the greater the relational privacy interests of the relatives in
suppressing publication of death images and words. In other words, there
is a positive correlation 217 between the circumstances of death and the
privacy interests: the greater the tragedy, the greater the privacy interests.
To some extent of course, any and all death is tragic. However, this second
factor focuses on the nature and circumstances of the death. For instance,
some deaths are of natural causes and medical conditions. In contrast, the
attack on the World Trade Center was horrendous, extraordinary, and
extreme, and the fire at the nightclub considered in Providence Journal was
one of the worst of its kind in the history of the United States.21 8
3. Contents of Communications -What is Seen and Heard
The third factor concentrates on the actual content of the images and
recordings at issue. In other words, what is portrayed in the photograph or
tape recording to which the relatives object? How graphic is the image?
How troubling is the voice? All images of death are not depicted equally.
The third factor is based, in part, on the analysis of the Texas court
discussed in Part II, which emphasized that all images of death are not per
se undignified. 219 Thus, there is a negative correlation under this factor for
courts to take into account: the more dignified the image of the dead, the
less interest in relational privacy.
4. The Relative Offended - Closeness of Connection to the Decedent
Courts applying this factor should examine the relationship between
the relative seeking to suppress and/or punish publication and the decedent
who is pictured in the offending image or heard on the tape recording. In
other words, how distant is the connection between the living and dead?
The United States Supreme Court in Favish wrote that its ruling "extends
to family members who object to the disclosure of graphic details
surrounding their relative's death., 220 However, the court failed to clarify
how far out of the immediate family circle the legally recognized relational
privacy interests extend. Surely there are some relatives who are so distant
to the deceased that their own privacy interests are minimal in terms of
217. A positive relationship is one "in which the variables change in the same direction. For
example, if as variable a increases, variable b increases, their relationship is positive."
MCINTYRE, supra note 213, at 300 (emphasis in the original).
218. See Powell & Lee, supra note 20 (describing the fire).
219. Supra note 180 and accompanying text.
220. Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 171 (2004) (emphasis
added).
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suppressing images or sounds of the decedent's death. Therefore, the
greater (closer) the connection between the surviving relative asserting a
privacy interest and the deceased, the greater the privacy interest at stake to
be balanced against the public's right to know. The line here should not be
conclusively drawn by the degree of blood relations between relatives. For
example, the deceased could have been raised or cared for by some relative
other than a biological parent. Thus, other circumstances must be taken
into account when making this determination.
5. The Deceased - Public Prominence and Voluntary Attention
When determining whether information is newsworthy under the tort
of public disclosure of private facts, courts "may consider several factors in
determining whether information published is newsworthy, including the
social value of the facts published, the extent to which the article intruded
into ostensibly private affairs, and whether the person voluntarily assumed
a position of public notoriety."'221 The more prominent the deceased was
during his or her lifetime and the longer the period during which the
deceased was in the public eye, the greater the right of the public to access
the images of death.
6. Justifications for Access - Morbid Interests and Sensational Prying
Three decades ago, in considering an invasion of privacy case for
public disclosure of private facts, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit noted that some facts might be sought and published not
because they are particularly newsworthy but because they amount to "a
morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its sake. 222 Under the
sixth factor, courts should address and consider the purpose for which the
requested information is sought and, in particular, the extent to which the
request constitutes a morbid and sensational prying into the dead: the more
morbid the interest, the greater the privacy interest.
It should be noted that the sixth and final factor was questioned and
criticized as a justification for privacy interests of the relatives of the dead
in the Space Shuttle Challenger case, where the New York Times had
sought the tapes containing the dying words of the crew. 23 Specifically,
Judge Harry Edwards writing for a five-person dissent in an en banc review
221. Invasion of Privacy: Publication of Private Facts, First Amendment Handbook,
http://www.rcfp.org/handbook/c02pO3.html (last visited July 15, 2005).
222. Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 1975).
223. Supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
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(a dissent that included then-future United States Supreme Court Associate
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg) stated that the fact "[t]hat the appellee's
purpose might be voyeuristic, and that its arguably morbid quest would
indeed impinge upon the privacy and enhance the grief of the astronauts'
families does not authorize the court to expand upon the privacy protection
that Congress ordained.
'" 224
As noted earlier, these six factors are to be considered in a flexible
totality-of-the-circumstances approach. While the factors are flexible in
their application, their use by judges and courts should lend some
consistency, predictably, and hopefully, coherence to the privacy-of-death
jurisprudence that is now growing in the United States.
V. CONCLUSION
The bottom line is that we are a society-including, in that society,
the news media-that is fixated on death. We also are a society-
including, among that society, of course, legislators and politicians-that is
seemingly obsessively concerned with shielding from minors' eyes images
of sex on the Internet225 and representations of violence in video games.
226
As this article has argued, we should be similarly concerned about
shielding our eyes-not just those of minors-from images of death when
those images potentially exploit and degrade the personal privacy interests
of relatives of the deceased.
224. N.Y. Times Co. v. Nat'l Aeronautics & Space Admin., 920 F.2d 1002, 1018 n.10 (D.C.
Cir. 1990) (Edwards, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
225. See generally Sue Ann Mota, Protecting Minors from Sexually Explicit Materials on
the Net: COPA Likely Violates the First Amendment According to the Supreme Court, 7 TUL. J.
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 95 (2005) (describing various legislative efforts to protect minors from
sexually explicit materials displayed on the Internet and World Wide Web).
226. See generally Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, Mediated Images of Violence and
The First Amendment: From Video Games to the Evening News, 57 ME. L. REV. 91 (2004)
(describing and analyzing numerous recent attempts by legislative bodies to regulate minors'
access to video games depicting images of violence); Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, The
2003 Legislative Assault on Violent Video Games: Judicial Realities and Regulatory Rhetoric, 11
VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 203 (2004) (criticizing, on First Amendment grounds, legislative
efforts to limit the access of children to certain video games portraying violence or having violent
storylines).
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